Critique of the Power of Judgment (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant)
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This entirely new translation of Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment follows the principles and high standards of all other volumes in The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. This volume includes for the first time the first draft of Kant's introduction to the work; the only English edition notes to the many differences between the first (1790) and second (1793) editions of the work; and relevant passages in Kant's anthropology lectures where he elaborated on his aesthetic views.
health and diet, of the soul as well as of the body (indeed why not all trades and arts?), have been believed to be able to be counted as practical philosophy, because they all contain a great many practical propositions. But while practical propositions certainly differ from theoretical ones, which contain the possibility of things and a b c d Vernunfterkenntnis reale Sitten Bedeutung 3 20: 196 First Introduction 20: 197 their determination, in the way in which they are presented, they do
although its ﬁgure, the character of all its parts and their composition, judged e in accordance with merely mechanical laws of nature, is entirely contingent for my power of judgment, I nevertheless think in its form and in its construction a necessity for being formed in a certain way, namely in accordance with a concept that precedes the formative causes of this organ, without which the possibility of this product of nature is not comprehensible for me in accordance with any mechanical natural
that has been laid down for it: and that is the succession of the determinations of one and the same thing.12 Now for nature in general (as the object of possible experience) that law is cognized as absolutely necessary. – Now, however, the objects of empirical cognition are still determined or, as far as one can judge a priori, determinable in so many ways apart from that formal time-condition that speciﬁcally distinct natures, besides what they have in common as belonging to nature in general,
is entirely different. It would be ridiculous if (the precise converse) someone who prided himself on his taste thought to justify himself thus: ‘‘This object (the building we are looking at, the clothing someone is wearing, the poem that is presented for judging) a is beautiful for me.’’ For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases merely him. Many things may have charm and agreeableness for him, no one will be bothered about that; but if he pronounces that something is beautiful, then he
grounded logical judgment. Now the judgment that the rose is (in its use) d agreeable is also, to be sure, an aesthetic and singular judgment, but not a judgment of taste, rather a judgment of the senses. That is to say, it differs from the former in that the judgment of taste carries with it a b c d Gemeingu¨ltigkeit The verb ‘‘designate’’ (bezeichnet) was added in the second edition. The word ‘‘logical’’ was added in the second edition. im Gebrauche; in the Academy edition, Windelband suggests