Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment: Critical Essays (Critical Essays on the Classics Series)
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Kant's Critique of the Power of Judgment, first published in 1790, was the last of the great philosopher's three critiques, following on the heels of Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788). In the first two, Kant dealt with metaphysics and morality; in the third, Kant turns to the aesthetic dimension of human experience, showing how our experiences of natural and artistic beauty, the sublime magnitude and might of nature, and of purposive organisms and ecological systems gives us palpable evidece that it is possible for us not only to form moral intentions, but also to realize our freely chosen moral goals within nature as we experience it. The present volume collects twelve of the most important critical discussions on the Critique of the Power of Judgment written by leading Kant scholars and aestheticians from the United States and Great Britain. In addition to a substantive introduction by the editor, the book includes an extensive, annotated bibliography of the most important work on Kant and on the background and arguments of his third Critique published throughout the twentieth century.
effects (A 203-4IB 248-49)-the only way we can understand reciprocal causation is in analogy with our own artistic or technical production, where a representation Kant's Principles of Reflecting Judgment 47 of a whole precedes and is the cause of the production of various parts that are then in turn the cause of the whole as an object. Here nothing is both cause and effect of itself, because it is only the representation of the whole that is the initial cause of the series, and the completed
answerability to the concept of some purpose. Criteria for being perfect are always criteria for being a perfect F, for some concept F. Pleasure in something's being a perfect F is never separable from the recognition that it is an F. Thus in general Kant regards a concept-related pleasure as coming about in some such way as shown in figure 3. There is a more mundane instance of this pattern, where the purpose we desire to have fulfilled is nothing but our own perception of a thing of a certain
world's contents relatively to the functions they serve. Thus, to say some stuff is a food, or is an engine fuel, is to hold it purposive, although only relatively, Kant would stress, and not as a selfcontained natural purpose (cf. §64). In either case the purposiveness is ideal rather than real, as he uses these terms. The existence of stuffs that serve as food is ultimately explained causally, in Kant's eyes, not by reference to any (Divine) design that men's needs be catered for, or, in the
quantities or magnitudes, that is, what Kant calls mathematical concepts (CPR, A 715/B 743). Concepts of qualities cannot be constructed a priori: "The shape of a cone we can form for ourselves in intuition, unassisted by any experience, according to its concept alone, but the colour of this cone must be previously given in some experience or other" (CPR, A 715/B 743). What enables us to form for ourselves a priori in intuition that which corresponds to a concept of magnitude? The answer is
On this interpretation, the creativity of genius remains entrenched in the uncontrolled and uncontrollable inspirations, and the expression of the ideas remains a matter of training. There seems to be ample evidence for such an interpretation, particularly given Kant's repeated assertions that "form" is a matter of taste tCll", §47, 5:310; §48, 5:312). However, this conclusion rests on a misapprehension of what the "form" appropriate to taste and the "material" appropriate to genius refer to. I