The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination (Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy)
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Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics.
This outstanding Handbook contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sections examining the most important aspects of the philosophy of imagination, including:
- Imagination in historical context: Aristotle, Descartes, Hume, Kant, Husserl, and Sartre
- What is imagination? The relation between imagination and mental imagery; imagination contrasted with perception, memory, and dreaming
- Imagination in aesthetics: imagination and our engagement with music, art, and fiction; the problems of fictional emotions and ‘imaginative resistance’
- Imagination in philosophy of mind and cognitive science: imagination and creativity, the self, action, child development, and animal cognition
- Imagination in ethics and political philosophy, including the concept of 'moral imagination' and empathy
- Imagination in epistemology and philosophy of science, including learning, thought experiments, scientific modelling, and mathematics.
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy
of Imagination is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind and psychology, aesthetics, and ethics. It will also be a valuable resource for those in related disciplines such as psychology and art.
an Imagery Experience under Placebo and Control Conditions,” Perceptual and Motor Skills 19:385–395. Sellars, W. (1978) “The Role of Imagination in Kant’s Theory of Experience,” in H.W. Johnstone (ed.) Categories: A Colloquium, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Smith, J. (2006) “Bodily Awareness, Imagination and the Self,” European Journal of Philosophy 14:49–68. Spivey, M., and J. Geng (2001) “Oculomotor Mechanisms Activated by Imagery and Memory: Eye Movements to Absent
plausibly argued that in order for a subject to R-remember a certain event, it is necessary that (3) the relevant event’s past occurrence has played a causal role in bringing about the subject’s present experience.12 None of these conditions needs to be met in order for a subject to S-imagine a certain event, and this in turn highlights an important metaphysical diﬀerence between R-memories and S-imaginings. In order for a subject to have an R-memory, the relevant experience needs to be “bound”
aesthetic judgment and artistic creation. In §1 of the third Critique, Kant begins his analysis of aesthetic judgments, in which we judge an object to be beautiful, by distinguishing them from the sorts of cognitive judgments he was concerned with in the ﬁrst Critique: “The judgment of taste is therefore not a cognitive judgment … but rather aesthetic, by which is understood one whose determining ground cannot be other than subjective” (KU 5:203). He identiﬁes this subjective determining ground
the same mental representation) and only diﬀer with regards to whether the object thus represented is actually present or not. Instead disjunctivists believe that veridical perception is constituted by a direct relation to an actual object, whereas hallucination either does not constitute any such relation, or constitutes a relation to a diﬀerent kind of “object,” e.g., to a “mere appearance” or to a “mental image.” Husserl’s account of imagining challenges both representationalism and
top-down (in mental imagery) or from bottom-up (in perception). But as there are mixed top-down/bottom-up cases (and, if we can believe the vast cognitive penetrability literature, that is, the literature on how perception is inﬂuenced by higher cognitive processes [see Lupyan et al. 2010; Macpherson 2012], these are the rule, not the exception), there are also mixed perception/mental imagery cases. Proponents of the Dependency Thesis may ﬁnd it more diﬃcult to make sense of these mixed